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ARGUMENT
I.
COCA COLA SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM A RELEASE TO WHICH IT WAS NOT
A PARTY AND WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED TO BENEFIT COCA COLA
In Krauss v. Utah DOT, 852 P.2d 1014 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals
interpreted a release with the exact same language that Coca-Cola is now relying on to argue that
it was released by the release signed in favor of Thomas Stengel. In Krauss, the plaintiff signed a
document releasing his parents, the drive, their insurance companies and "any and all other firms,
persons, or corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, of any and all" causes of
action. That is the same exact language as appears in the release in this case. As Coca-Cola
states in its Brief:
That language specifically states that it releases Thomas & Susan Stengel,
Nationawide Mutual Co. and "any and all other persons, firms and corporations,
whether herein named or referred to or not." The release contains a reservation of
rights, somewhat similar to the reservation in Nelson, but that reservation does not
concern vicarious liability, or reservation of a claim against Mr. Stengel's
employer based upon respondeat superior. Rather, the reservation concerns Mr.
Peterson's contractual right to receive further compensation for Mr. Stengel's
negligence through underinsured motorist coverage from his own insurer
American States. Therefore, the release and exoneration of Mr. Stengel releases
Swire and prevents imputing Stengel's alleged negligent conduct derivatively to
Swire, (emphasis added) (Brief of Respondent, pp.20-21.)
In Krauss, the Court of Appeals lays out the principles of how releases are interpreted.
"We adhere instead to the straight forward concept that releases are contractual provisions and
should be interpreted according to well developed rules of contract interpretation." Krauss at
1018. The parties in Krauss argued that one of three different rules of interpretation regarding
releases should be used: the specific identity rule, four corners rule, or intent rule. The Utah
Court of Appeals did not adopt the specific identity rule, because it stated that if the Utah
1

Legislature intended that rule to be used, it could have said so. Krauss at 1019. Instead, the Utah
Court of Appeals used the four corners rule and intent rule as basic rules of contract
interpretation. "Insofar as the parties to this appeal purport that two distinct rules exist, they
ignore the fact that both rules are attempts to discover the intent of the parties to a release.
Accordingly, we need not choose between the two rules, but rather apply each, in turn, in the
course of routine contract interpretation. If the release is unambiguous, it is construed as a matter
of law within its four corners; if it is not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is appropriately
considered to glean the intent of the parties to the release." Krauss at 1020. The Court of
Appeals found the release in Krauss to be ambiguous because UDOT is a governmental entity,
and not necessarily covered under the phrase, "all other persons, firms and corporations."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals looked to extrinsic evidence to glean the intent of the parties.
"Our task, however, is not to determine whether Krauss proceeded by the safest course, but is
instead to determine whether the parties to the release contract, in employing the words used,
intended UDOT to be released." ML at 1021.
A.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS ALSO ALLOWED WHEN THERE IS AN
UNREVEALED AND UNDISCOLSED PRINCIPAL.
As Plaintiff admits, the Coca-Cola Defendants are corporations, so the reason why the
Court of Appeals found the release ambiguous in Krauss does not apply to this case. However,
the evidence demonstrates that Stengel was acting within the scope and course of his
employment when he injured Plaintiff. When he obtained a release that his employer now claims
released it from liability, Stengel was acting within the scope of his employment. Since Plaintiff
did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the bargain was completed, the release
cannot preclude liability on the part of the principal. In the Brief of Respondent, Coca-Cola
2

attempts to distinguish the case Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992). Petitioner
Peterson cited the case as standing for the proposition that an undisclosed principal is liable for
the acts of his agent, even though the principal is undisclosed. However, as the Court of Appeals
clearly stated in Krauss, a release is analyzed pursuant to general contract principles. Krauss at
1019. Therefore, the same contract principles that apply to contracts to release also apply to
contracts to purchase property.
In Garland the Supreme Court observed:
It is well established in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent
within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective of whether the principal is
disclosed or undisclosed. The fact that an agent acts in his own name without
disclosing his principal does not preclude liability on the part of the principal
when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent. 3
Am. Jur. 2d Agency 320 (1986). This is true even though the third person
dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after
the bargain was completed. Holman-O.D. Baker Co. v. Pre-Design, Inc., 104
N.H. 116, 118, 179 A2.d 454, 455 (1962). The Restatement (Second) of Agency
186 (cmt.c) (1957) states that for the purpose of proving that the agent was acting
within his authority, parol evidence is admissible, even though the contract is in
writing, (emphasis added).
Therefore, this Court must also look to the intent of the parties to determine whether Coca-Cola
is released by this release.

In Krauss, the Court of Appeals held that "when a party not

specifically named in a release attempts to avail itself of the release, that party bears the burden
of proving it is an intended beneficiary of the release." Krauss at 1023. Coca-Cola cannot point
to any evidence in this case that it was an intended beneficiary of the release. The only evidence
in the case regarding whether Coca-Cola was intended to be a beneficiary of the release is
contained in the release itself and in the Affidavit of David Goodwill. The release does not
mention any of the Coca-Cola defendants. The Affidavit of David Goodwill states:

3

In the fall of 1994, when finalizing settlement negotiations with American States,
the underinsured carrier of Stephen Peterson, counsel for Peterson, David
Goodwill spoke with Thomas Stengel. He learned for the first time that on the
day of the accident, Stengel was employed by Coca Cola and when he hit the
Peterson vehicle head-on he was going from one of Coca Cola's customer's stores
to another store in the course and scope of his employment.
(Exhibit 5 to Petitioner's Brief.)
Because Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel did not know that Coca-Cola was the employer of
Stengel at the time the release was signed, Coca-Cola could not have been intended to be a
beneficiary of the release. Therefore, under Krauss, Coca-Cola fails in its burden to prove that it
was an intended beneficiary of the release.

II.
THE COCA-COLA DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A SET OFF OF $350,000.
Contrary to Respondent Coca-Cola's assertion that Petitioner Peterson is raising his
arguments against the set off issue for the first time on appeal, counsel for Peterson addressed
this issue at oral argument before Judge Dever on August 8, 2000. In its Brief on page 41, CocaCola cites to pages 20 through 40 of the transcript as evidence that this argument was not raised
before the trial court. However, the argument made by counsel for Peterson regarding this issue
of the set off is located on pages 2 through 8 of the transcript. (See transcript attached as Reply
Addendum Exhibit 1.)
In the Brief of the Petitioner, counsel set out the arguments why Coca-Cola is not entitled
to a set off of $350,000, and hereby incorporates those arguments in this Reply Brief. Counsel
will not repeat those arguments, but only address those issues brought up by Coca-Cola in its
Brief. Counsel for Petitioner does agree with footnote 16 to Brief of Respondent which states
that the parties do not dispute that Coca-Cola is entitled to at least a set off of $50,000 for the
4

amount received from Stengel's insurer Nationwide. However, Coca-Cola tries to argue that the
term "entitled to recover damages from owners or operators" in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22305(9)(a) and (b) somehow does not apply to mean a vicariously liable employer, such as CocaCola. The Coca-Cola defendants are corporations, and the only way that a corporation can act is
through its agents. Mr. Stengel was an employee, and thus an agent, of Coca-Cola at the time of
the accident, and was operating his vehicle for Coca-Cola when he caused the accident that
injured Mr. Peterson. Coca-Cola states in its Brief that the "statue does not address the vicarious
liability of an employer of an underinsured operator or owner..." (Brief of Respondent, p. 43.)
However, from a basic understanding of how a corporation acts through its agents, it is clear that
the statute does apply to vicariously liable employers, such as Coca-Cola. Mr. Stengel was
operating the vehicle for Coca-Cola.
Next, Coca-Cola argues that because both American States and Coca-Cola are "both
derivatively liable for the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, Mr. Stengel, American States based
upon contract and Swire based upon common law tort, both would have claims against Mr.
Stengel for amounts paid because of his negligence." (Brief of Respondent, p.45). Then
Respondent argues that because "they stand on equal footing to the other and this equality does
not create a situation which demands application of the subrogation doctrine." (Brief of
Respondent, p.45). To the contrary, Coca-Cola may be able to pursue a claim against Mr.
Stengel, but American States is bound by the release signed by Mr. Peterson. "Insurer seeking
subrogation has only those rights maintained by its insured; insurer steps into its insured shoes."
Nimmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 1154 (Mont. 1995).

5

Therefore, American States and Coca-Cola are not on equal footing. American States
must pursue its subrogation interest against Coca-Cola only, and since Stengel was operating the
vehicle in the course and scope of his employment, and therefore operating it for Coca-Cola,
under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(a) and (b), Coca-Cola is an operator.
American States paid Stephen Peterson amounts under its UIM coverage which were
legitimately owed by Coca-Cola. By legal or equitable principles (and by essential fairness)
American States is entitled to recover the amounts.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Petitioner and set forth above, Plaintiff Stephan
Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the interlocutory Order dated August 28,
2000 that granted Defendant' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand the case for
trial allowing Plaintiff to try his case against the Defendants under a theory of vicarious liability/
respondeat superior.

DATED this /

"flay of August, 2001.

I
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.
,«•**"

a. 4

T M DALTON DUNN
PAUL J. SMONSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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Third District Court Judge
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Dale J. Lambert
Christensen & Jensen
50 S. Main #1500
84144
323-5000

Btvt.1 i ) L o w e IIPII i oR CC1
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PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-002 7
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 8, 2000)

3

THE COURT: Okay, what's that case number?

4

COURT CLERK:

5

THE COURT: Why don't you enter your appearances while

6

It's 960901005,

we're waiting.

7

MR. LAMBERT: Dale Lambert for the defendants, Swire

8

Pacific, dba Coca-Cola Bottling.

9

UNIDENTIFIED:

10
11

And Rebecca (inaudible) for Coca-Cola.

MR. DUNN: Tim Dunn and David Goodwill on behalf of
the plaintiff, Stephen Peterson.
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THE COURT: This is case No. 960901005. This is the

13

defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

14

proceed.

15

You may

MR. LAMBERT: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, we

16

had courtesy copies of all of the memoranda directed to your

17

court yesterday.

18

I hope you got those.

THE COURT: I believe I have most of everything, I

19

think —

yours, your (inaudible) and the other side

20

(inaudible).

21

MR. LAMBERT: Correct.

22

THE COURT: Okay.

23

MR. LAMBERT: Thank you, your Honor.

24

MR. DUNN:

25

Your Honor, we also filed a motion to

strike their late filed reply memorandum, perhaps that should

-3I b e mil 11 essf j d I i J si .

]

2 I

M R . LAMBERT:

A n d i f they wi sh t o address that first,

3 I I suppose if they wish to make a statement then 1 w i l l respond.
}

I

Tlli

5

i 'i >ni' i

MR, DUNN

i it ' i .

jf J may, y o u r H o n o r , it's o u r p o s i t i o n

6

that t h e briefing requirements that t h e Biules of P r o c e d u r e

J'

pirovi de • -

8

T H E COURT:

9

M R . DUNN:

I know all t h o s e nil e s .
Oka,}

One reason that it makes a really
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memorandum a position that they attribute to us that w e don't

12

take

13

1:1 La t: they a r e enti tied t o a credit of $ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 , regardless of

]4

the 1: u] i ng wi th reference to the release on the basis that the

15

Joi nt Obligor's Act in some fashion gives them entitlement as a

16

joint 0 t>iig 0 r with the American States Insurance Company for

17

the payments that .American States made by vina*-

18

contractual obligation, and Mr. Peterson, because •-; * r,«-

]9

insurance pol icy that they had wi th Mr. Peterser:

20

.

21

\^ii

They have misinformed the Cour t that it is our position

. an< I I .he Ha] I ::!:<i>i! I
'.**'-
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r>os:tion
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... .
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and therefore Hartford's obligation i s one based on tort, and
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tli€
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contract.
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Indeed if their reply m e m o r a n d u m would have b e e n filed
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in a timely fashion we could have presented to the Court the

2

release and trust agreement that Mr. Peterson signed with the

3

American States Insurance Company, under which he assigned by

4

way of subrogation the rights to recover the $300,000 that

5

American States paid under their underinsured motorist policy

6

obligation, and in fact this lawsuit is pursuant of their

7

subrogation rights, as well as the rights that Mr. Peterson

8

himself has to recover against Coca-Cola.

9

It seems to me that the rules should be adhered to

10

with reference to a brief as lengthy as this one, and as

11

misinforming as to the effect of the joint obligor and co-

12

obligor statute, and their rights to set off.

13

We do agree that they're entitled to a credit for the

14

amounts paid by Nationwide Insurance on behalf of Mr. Steingel,

15

an employee of Coca-Cola, but he is in a totally different

16

relationship as the Joint Obligor's Act clearly points out is

17

American States. Thank you, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lambert?

19

MR. LAMBERT:

If I might, your Honor, let me briefly

20

address the motion to strike, which astonished me beyond words.

21

When we were discussing this motion, Mr. Goodwill, who filed

22

the motion to strike, and I discussed when we would file the

23

motion, because we had talked about this motion for a long

24

time, and when I would supply —

25

response because he had problems responding in May because of

I mean he would supply a
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for a decade —

2

strike based on this, and I will admit —

3

astonished at Mr. Dunn's argument this morning that the reason

4

it is prejudicial —

5

to strike —

6

for 20 years, I have never had a motion to
I am astonished,

because this was not raised in the motion

is because we raised a new argument.

Let me quote from our original motion.

"We move as an

7

alternative that we get credit by $350,000, the amount already

8

paid to him by Mr. Steingel's liability carrier."

9

this issue in our original memorandum and our original motion.

We raised

10

It was not contested in the reply memo, and so whatever

11

argument that Mr. Dunn wishes to raise today was not raised in

12

their memo, even though we raised the issue in our original

13

motion.

14

Now he has an opportunity to argue it, but it is not

15

true we've surprised somebody here. This is our position from

16

the very beginning, and frankly, the surprise in this case is

17

that they now are raising an objection to the argument that was

18

raised in our original memorandum.

19

I suggest to the Court that there is no prejudice to

20

our admittedly late filing, and we simply ask the Court to

21

exercise its discretion and not to strike our memorandum.

22

Thank you.

23

THE COURT: Very well.

24

MR. DUNN: May I briefly respond, your Honor?

25

THE COURT: You may.

-7,M.B

I i i s. .t I won] d 1 i k:e to clean up just a few

DUNN:

misapprehensions.

Mr

Lambert indicated that I had said that

, * ***..* *- , r : + l r

-' i

- - ,r*

rf>~^-*-

«rgument.
y

ctrong

*.*

-«,:•- vi~

i
.

: ^ : F --

they

: aK& * ne : j s . i t i o n

* > *~ — * ~ r — a r g u m e n t

:•• *-r

\

v
-

^

do

ria.-tiff
1 ed

* »*i*- -: e c i :

v : -i. n. t

THE COURT:

.< .

AT • v- -.: ror/f-r

rftt.

THE COURT:

i .inaudible) .i:

..; . *-* v

THE COURT:

:r : n- -epl\ :

.r* w< j. ,

*d^l -wcs, uuwi: . J. -jagt- •

:

c: the co-cbliuoi . and i iic eo-ol . : ?c

> ,
A s*

' uv. x,^ ^:^.ijw:f Ste^nge.
;

i

:f v

' :K* _

ontests the obligation
: : r i situation . s

w:th

J€- - \a

Lambert's relationship w:i th myself goes back probably

eat"!'

lave always given him extensions whenever he has
requested it,
"

r^

He has apparently had some conversations w:i th

Goodwill that ' -

- • .a

-

x

suspect we woul d have granted one, and indeed the Court
25 I pleases, however the Cour t would like to handle the memorandum

-81
2

is all right with me,
I have great respect for Mr. Lambert, and with that

3

deference in mind, if we can raise the issue of challenging

4

their interpretation of co-obligation and trust (inaudible).

5
6
7

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) raised the issue early in the

game so that we (inaudible) so I'll allow (inaudible).
MR. DUNN:

May we submit to the Court a copy of the

8

agreement between Mr. Peterson and American States so that the

9

Court can have it?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. DUNN:

12
13
14

at this time.

You may.
I believe we have a copy that we can submit

May I approach the bench?

MR. LAMBERT:

Do you have a copy for me, Mr. Dunn,

because I don't believe we've ever been supplied with one.

15

MR. DUNN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. DUNN:

Can we get a copy made for him?
Okay, Mr. Dunn, you may proceed.
Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Lambert said

18

that $350,000 was paid by Mr. Steingel.

19

misstatement.

20

carrier, Nationwide, and $350,000 was paid by American States.

21

I think we all know that.

22

I believe that's a

Fifty was paid by Mr. Steingel's insurance

MR. LAMBERT:

I respect Mr. Dunn as well.

We have

23

filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and we have made

24

three arguments for the Court's consideration.

25

First of all, we have argued that the relief executed
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1

by the plaintiff, Stephen Peterson, his wife, Gail Peterson,

2

and their attorney, Mr. Goodwill released Swire for any

3

vicarious liability for the actions of Thomas Steingel, their

4

employee.

5

THE COURT:

I don't mean to cut you off, Mr. Lambert,

6

but I've read these memos and I think the critical issue here

7

is the interaction between the two (inaudible) and why

8

vicarious liability (inaudible) Section 15 —

9

versus the other (inaudible) to prevail, why don't* you discuss

10
11

I mean Title 15

those.
MR. LAMBERT:

All right, I will be happy to, because

12

we don't —

13

We can argue back and forth about the various decisions, but

14

the controlling decision is Nelson vs. The LPS Church or

15

presiding bishopric, and the citation is 935 P.2d 512.

16

1997 decision, and in this case —

17

the Court to review that decision, but in that case the Court

18

refused the history of vicarious liability in this context.

19
20

under the Court's ruling it's not that complicated.

It is a

and of course, I encourage

Originally Utah and most states said that the release
of an agent released the principal.

Then Utah adopted the

21 J Comparative Negligence Act, and the Court says that under the
22 I Comparative Negligence Act they conceded that the release of an
23

agent didn't necessarily release the principal, and then Utah

24

substituted the Comparative Negligence Act for the Liability

25

Reform Act, and in that act, the Liability Reform Act, they

-101 I changed the definition of defendant to define defendant
2

essentially as a person with fault*

3

And the Supreme Court refused that history in Nelson

4

because both sides were arguing about the interpretations of

5

the act. It involves the same issue involved in this case, and

6

that is was — we had the release of an agent, the scout master

7

as I recall, and the question is was his release —

8

amount to the release of the principal, in other words the

9

church.

did it

10

Once the Utah Supreme Court, after reviewing the

11

history that I just reviewed, the Utah Supreme Court held

12

and they reviewed that argument and said, "Notwithstanding the

13

reliance of the parties in their briefs on the competing

14

interpretations of the Liability Reform Act, we conclude that

15

this case may be resolved pursuant to the Joint Obligations

16

Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 15-4-1 through Section 15-4-

17

5."

18

what controls in this case, an agent principle case, is the

19

liability is the Joint Obligations Act."

20

—

So they said, "We don't need to resolve those differences,

Then they cite and quote the provisions of 15-4-4.

21

"The obligee's," and the obligee is obviously in this case the

22

plaintiff or the claimant, "release or discharge of one or more

23

of several obligors or of one or more joint or of joint several

24

obligors," so in other words, the plaintiff's release of this

25

obligor, "shall not discharge co-obligors against upholding the
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obligee in writing and as part of the same transaction as the

2

release or discharge expressly reserves his rights."

3

N O W in the Nelson case our Supreme Court noted that in

4

that case the release expressly reserved the rights against the

5

church.

6

not intend to release the church and specifically reserved all

7

claims against the church."

8
9

They said, "The agreement stated that plaintiff did

Now in the release at issue here there is a
reservation of rights, but that reservation goes to the

10

underinsured motorist carriers or American States.

11

express reservation of rights against an employer, and

12

therefore under the Joint Obligations Act and the

13

interpretation thereof by the Utah Supreme Court, because those

14

rights weren't reserved, then the principal is released by the

15

release of not only the agent, but all other companies and

16

persons, et cetera.

17

There is no

Now just to make it clear, the Joint Obligations Act

18

limits that language to 15-4-5, which is admittedly a fairly

19

obtuse section.

20

first one is in the first paragraph that talks about if an

21

obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express

22

reservation of rights against the co-obligor —

23

we've got here —

24

obligor release or discharge didn't pay as much of the claim.

25

But there are two sections.

One is —

and the

that's what

then knows or has reason to know that the

Mr. Goodwill in his reply memorandum argues that he

-121 | didn't know or have reason to know.

So the first section does

2 | not apply, but even if it did apply, it's clear that it doesn't
3 I apply to this case.
The second section says, MIf an obligee's so releasing

4
5

or discharging an obligor is not then such knowledge or reason

6

to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be

7

satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts; A) the

8

amount of the fractional share of the obligor release or

9

discharge."

10

Frankly, I have no idea what that was language means.

11

If we have a 50/50 partner, I know what it means, or if there

12

was an agreement amongst the obligors, I know what it means,

13

but what we have here is the right of an indemnity of an

14

employer against an employee for the employee's vicarious

15

negligent act. So 100 percent ultimately of the share is to be

16

assigned to the employee, but we don't need to resolve that

17

because B) is the lesser of the two amounts. It says, "B) the

18

amount that such obligor was bound," and that's Mr. Steingel,

19

"was bound by a contract or relation with the co-obligor to

20

pay."

21

Well, Utah law and law universally makes it clear that

22

when a principal, in this case an employer, is liable in

23

(inaudible) superial or under the principles of agency to the

24

acts of employees, to the extent of vicarious liability, the

25

principal has the right to indemnity over against the agent or
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the employee.
So under that provision, Mthe amount which such

2
3

obligor was bound by its contract or relation," that's what we

4

have here, -with the co-obligor, the employer, to pay."

5

that's 100 percent of the liability that is vicarious, and

6

that's what our motion goes to.

7

Well,

So under the Joint Obligations Act, which our Supreme

8

Court in Nelson has held applies to this very situation, if

9

rights were not reserved they are released, and that seems

10

crystal clear under the Nelson decision.

11

confusion or the multiple cases, it is resolved by our Supreme

12

Court's most recent ruling that —

13

statutes.

14

Despite all of the

in resolving those two

Now let me address the other arguments briefly as

15

well.

16

plaintiff now wants to claim some seven years later that the

17

release is void, and they make three arguments.

18

Despite taking of the money and releasing Steingel, the

First of all, they claim fraud.

Now fraud has to be

19

pled by nine elements, or there are nine elements that have to

20

be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

21

shred of evidence cited in this case that Mr. Steingel, that

22

his insurer, Nationwide, or that Swire made any fraudulent

23

statements at all to the Petersons or their attorney.

24

just no evidence of fraud.

25

There is not one

There's

There's no evidence at all that my client, Swire, knew

-141 | about or even participated in these settlement negotiations.
2 | The only thing they suggest is that there may be some kind of
3 I affirmative duty to tell Peterson all of the relevant facts.
4

Well, there is no legal precedent for that proposition.

5

fact, we cite in our memorandum John Call Engineering, a case

6

that makes clear that there is no issue to explain to the

7

opposite side all of the impacts of the release.

8

evidence of fraud.

9

In

There is no

The second argument they make is that it is mutual

10

mistake. Now the agreement failed to conform to both —

11

that requires that the agreement failed to conform to both

12

parties' intentions, and that in this case the plaintiff was

13

mistaken about the effect of the release, and the party that he

14

is releasing knew of this mistake and kept quiet.

15

and

There is no evidence to establish mutual mistake.

I,

16

of course, can't talk about what was in Mr. Peterson's mind or

17

his wife's mind or in their counsel's mind, but there is no

18

evidence in the record that Mr. Steingel or his insurer or

19

Swire, what their intentions were with respect to the release

20

of the employer, or that they understood that there was an

21

intention upon — by Mr. Peterson.

22

At very best this is a unilateral mistake, although I

23

don't think it was a mistake at all, what they did was move on

24

to the next stage of their negotiations and knew what they were

25

doing. But at most it's a unilateral mistake.

There's not a
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shred of evidence of a mutual mistake here.

2

Then the third argument that troubles me made that

3

they would raise at this late date is that Mr. Peterson was

4

incompetent at the time he executed the release.

Now they do

5

not present any evidence that that was the case.

The only

6

evidence that they present is that in December of 1997, nearly

7

three and a half years —

8

release was signed, Gail Peterson, Mrs. Peterson, was appointed

9

as guardian and conservator for Stephen Peterson.

10

no, four and a half years after the

My comments about that is first of all, it's not

11

evident that he was incompetent at the time that he signed the

12

release, something that took place four and a half —

13

four and a half years later.

14

been appointed conservator, it is not evident that he was

15

incompetent.

16

nearly

Secondly, although she may have

Now this wasn't done in this lawsuit.

It was done ex

17

parte because I suspect the plaintiff's counsel knew that we

18

would have vigorously opposed what appears to me to be strictly

19

a strategic effort on their part, but we didn't know about this

20

contingence, we didn't know about this appointment until the

21

reply memo was filed, the first time it was ever revealed to

22

us.

23

has declared Mr. Peterson incompetent, and frankly, I think

24

it's a disservice to Mr. Peterson.

25

I contend seriously that there is no medical doctor who

The neuropsychological testing in this case by
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plaintiff's experts and defendant's experts alike put him in

2

the normal range of virtually every subtest they performed.

3

Now there is a big difference and a genuine argument

4

and disagreement among the parties about whether Mr. Peterson

5

was injured, but that is far different than claiming that he is

6

incompetent, which is a far different standard.

7

Third, this release was not signed only by Mr.

8

Peterson, but it was signed by Gail Peterson, who is — was his

9

wife, is his wife, and also is now the appointed conservator.

10

It is also signed by their lawyer as witness, who was there to

11

explain the effect of a release to them.

12

only by the plaintiff, who they now claim or suggest is

13

incompetent, but by his future conservator and by their lawyer,

14

and under these circumstances in the very (inaudible) that is a

15

ratification of the settlement agreement, its waiver is

16

estoppel from asserting an argument these many years later that

17

a release signed in 1992 is voidable.

18

So it wasn't signed

Now the other portion of our — well, there's two

19

other portions of our motion for partial summary judgment. One

20

is that if the release doesn't release the principal, as we

21

clearly believe that it does, we are entitled to that money

22

which was paid in behalf of the tortfeasor, that is paid in his

23

behalf because it is based on his liability.

24
25

Now Mr. Dunn says that he would like to argue about
that, and since I don't know what his arguments are, I will
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wait and listen to what his argument is. It is clear that in

2

our original motion and memorandum we argued that we were

3

entitled to a credit of $350,000, There was no mystery or

4

hiding of that argument.

5

review the reply memorandum, that they did not resist that

6

effort.

7

So this is a brand new argument today made for the first time

8

in this case that we're not entitled to the credit of the

9

$350,000.

10

It is equally clear, if you will

Indeed, they concede that we're entitled to a credit.

Finally, we argued as a matter of law in this case

11

there is not a basis for punitive damages. Obviously Utah law

12

allows punitive damages only in the most extraordinary cases.

13

They must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, it has to

14

be evident, not mere allegation, and the tortfeasor —

15

case, Mr. Steingel —

16

and reckless indifference.

17

intentionally and with reckless indifference, which meant that

18

he was aware of a high degree of probability that serious harm

19

would result to another and that his conduct was highly

20

outrageous, it was outrageous.

21

in this

had to deliberately manifest a knowing
In other words, he had to act

Now Mr. Steingel's falling asleep at the wheel and

22

going across the line at 9th East is not a case for punitive

23

damages, and that is just the very initial inquiry.

24

his conduct was punitive in nature, that does not mean the

25

employer is liable under some theory of vicarious liability.

Even if
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The circumstances under which an employer might be held liable

2

for the punitive conduct of the employee is outlined in Johnson

3

vs. Rogers, a newspaper corporation agency.

4

said there was a factual issue in that case because the

5

employer failed to discover the DUI history of this driver when

6

they hired him.

The Supreme Court

7

Secondly, they were aware that he came to work

8

intoxicated and was aware that he drank on the job, and

9

thirdly, that supervisors participated in the consumption of

10

alcohol and drugs with the tortfeasor and others.

11

this case.

12

That is not

There are four circumstances under which an issue can

13

be created.

14

that's not true here. Nobody contends that Mr. Steingel was a

15

principal of the company.

16

First, a principal or managerial agent — well,

Secondly, the agent was unfit and the employer was

17

reckless in employing him or retaining him.

18

evidence at all on this issue is that one manager testified

Now the only

19 I that "he was not one of our better employees."

That doesn't

20

mean that he was an unfit driver, because there is absolutely

21

no evidence in this case that Mr. Steingel had a habit of

22

falling asleep, that he had a bad driving record, either before

23

he was hired or while he was hired.

24

support towards that.

25

So there is no evidentiary

The third is ratification or approval of the act.
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Again, there is no evidence in this case that there was any

2

ratification applauds approval of what happened to Mr.

3

Steingel.

4

found it a preventable accident, but they suggest we didn't

5

punish him, we didn't discipline him.

6

isn't in the record, but even if that were true, we have cited

7

law that indicates the failure to discipline is not the same as

8

ratification or approval of an act.

9

we approved of him falling asleep at the wheel.

10

In fact, the evidence is to the contrary.

They

Well, that evidence

There is no evidence that

Finally, authorized the doings in the manner of the

11

act.

12

because we have no policy against employees holding second

13

jobs, and that indeed some people, at least, in the company

14

were aware that he held a second job.

15

establish any evidence that we were aware that he chose to work

16

all night on the night of the accident, or that we were aware

17

that he was exhausted, if in fact that was the case, or that we

18

authorized him falling asleep on the job.

19

And what they suggest here is that we have done that

But that does not

Frankly, the argument against having a policy against

20

others holding a job, frankly, there are some limits to privacy

21

and rights to our ability to control people's off-duty contact.

22

We can't tell people that they can't hold other jobs, or for

23

that matter take night classes and stay up late studying, or

24

have a baby that might cry all night so they're tired, or have

25

a policy again telling them when they have to go to bed.

That
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argument, I think, is absurd on its face.

2

Punitive damages are not intended to provide

3

plaintiffs with additional compensation or settlement leverage.

4

These courts frequently dismiss punitive damage allegations and

5

make it clear they should only go to a jury in exceptional

6

circumstances to deter outrageous and malicious conduct, and

7

that is simply not the case either with the tortfeasor, Mr.

8

Steingel, but more importantly, it's certainly not the case

9

with my client, Swire. Thank you.

10

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn?

11

MR. DUNN: If the Court pleases, I'll address the

12

motion for partial summary judgment except to the punitive

13

damages suffered, Mr. Goodwill will address that.

14

what we're doing on the time constraints here, but do you have

15

a deadline that we can work towards?

16
17

I don't know

THE COURT: I have another case, I don't see anybody
here yet.

18

MR. DUNN: Okay.

Your Honor, Coca-Cola is seeking to

19

be unjustly enriched here at the expense of an injured party,

20

to whom they are liable as tortfeasor for the desire to take

21

advantage of somebody else's release, and indeed a desire to

22

take advantage of somebody else's American States' payments for

23

which they contributed nothing.

24

this.

25

The law now does not allow

If you take a look at the (inaudible) of the cases
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that have been handed down by the Supreme Court and the court

2

of appeals since the adoption of the Liability Reform Act in

3

1986, it is clear that in order to take advantage of provision

4 I of release, you've got to have some participation in the
5

(inaudible).

6

Nelson vs. the Church, the Corporation of the

7

Presiding Bishopric of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day

8

Saints, this is the case that says — Mr. Lambert says is in

9

some way controlling, acknowledges in its own first footnote —

10

second footnote, that we don't get to the question that this

11

case poses, although it tells us a whole lot about how they

12

would rule if they did.

13

In this case there was an intent to have a release

14

that wasn't paid for by the church to protect the church — the

15

very first sentence of the opinion says, "We hold that it does

16

not—" the second sentence.

17

The language in the decision repeatedly states the

18

principles that ought to be followed, "A release given by a

19

person seeking recovery through one or more defendants does not

20

discharge any other defendant, unless the release so provides,"

21

and the —

22

application of this case when they said—

THE COURT: No, they addressed all the issues in that

23

case, and the church, LDS Church, presiding bishopric was not

24

released was because it was a special reservation (inaudible)

25

and if it hadn't been for that special reservation the Court
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advised that it would have found in favor of the defendant.

2

That's my reading of the case.

3 I

MR. DUNN: No, that's not my interpretation of the

4 I case.

What the case says is —

in footnote 2, for example,

5

"Plaintiff argues that the church's fault for purposes of the

6

LRA is imputed from the acts of Crabtree (phonetic).

7

contend that the church is a defendant under the LRA because we

8

find, however, that the Joint Obligors Act specifically

9

addresses these issues, we do not need to determine the merits

10

Thus they

of plaintiff's interpretation."

11

In footnote 3, "We recognize in Krukowitz that Section

12

78-27-42 of the CNA was a pro tanto repeal of Section 15-4-4 of

13

the Joint Obligors Act. To the extent that the LRA still

14

addresses regular co-defendants who are liable because of

15

fault, the LRA will supersede or act as pro tanto repeal of

16

Sections 15-4-4 as to those defendants."

17

THE COURT: Now all that's saying is if you have a

18

bunch of defendants involved in a lawsuit that you're not going

19

to be releasing them unless there's a specific release of them.

20

But if it's a vicarious liability, which is what they seem to

21

be saying that happened with the church in that case, it would

22

fall under Title 15, and that under Title 15 they are liable

23

because there was a specific reservation against them.

24

had to be specific, they (inaudible) liable.

25

MR. DUNN:

Well, let's assume that the Court is

If they
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correct when it says there was a pro tanto elimination of 15-4-

2

4 by a decision that was handed down in Krukowitz.

3

about the Krukowitz case because it's> important, too

4

(inaudible) of cases

We can talk

15-4-5, the section that Mr. Lambert indicates» he is

5
6

unable to understand, comes into play even if you leave 15-4-4

7

in place.

8

"and in the absence of such a reservation of rights shall

9

discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in Section

What he didn't read from 15-4-4 was the last phrase,

10

15-4-5."

11

do you do?

12

this is the interpretation of (inaudible) applies, and the

13

Court will apply, the first paragraph, "If you know about the

14

existence of a co-obligor," and we didn't know about the

15

existence of a co-obligor so we go to the second paragraph, "If

16

an obligee's so releasing or discharging an obligor is not then

17

such knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against

18

the co-obligor—" if you don't know that Coca-Cola exists, if

19

they h a v e —

20

So if there isn't a specific enumeration, then what
You take a look at 15-4-5, and I've suggested that

THE COURT:

Are you going to have a reason to know?

21

mean wouldn't someone say, "(See, I wonder who this guy works

22

for, if he's working (inaudible)."

23

who he's working for?

24
25

MR. DUNN:

Are you going to find out

Isn't that something you ought to ask?

I think it was at 1:42 in the morning, and

Mr. Peterson,r as pointed out by Mr< Goodwill'J3 memorandum,

I
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which I also signed, was in a position where the injuries he

2

received were severe, the financial conditions that they were

3

under were severe. He settled the claim with Steingel.

4

not settle the claim with Coca-Cola.

5

proof by virtue of other cases that the Supreme Court and the

6

court of appeals have handed down are clearly on the person

7

seeking the effect of the release.

8
9

He did

Indeed the burden of

There is no showing in the evidence that there is a
"should have known" situation.

They were only told that he was

10

the driver, they were not told that Coca-Cola was employing him

11

at the time. Coca-Cola knew about it within hours of the

12

accident having occurred.

13
14
15

That's in the transcript o f —

THE COURT: No, they're not saying they didn't know
about the accident.
MR. DUNN:

They knew about the accident and didn't

16

come forward.

They're the undisclosed principal here.

17

obligation exists on anybody's part, it makes an affirmative

18

action to establish what the facts were, the obligation was on

19

Coca-Cola. But Coca-Cola didn't come forward and say, "Mr.

20

Steingel is our employee, we're also responsible for his

21

actions." Coca-Cola hid in the bushes and then comes out later

22

and says, "Neiner, neiner, we've got you, you signed a release,

23

a release is a general release."

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. DUNN:

(Inaudible) hid in the bushes.
(Inaudible) they didn't do anything.

If an
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THE COURT:

2 |

MR. DUNN:

(Inaudible).
To find out if there (inaudible).

So then

3 | we come to paragraph 2 in 15-4-5, "If an obligee's so releasing
4 | or discharging an obligor is not then such knowledge or reason
5 I to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be
6

satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely

7

the amount of the fractional share of the obligor released or

8

discharged," and I suggest to you that that means the amount of

9

money that was paid, "or B) the amount that such obligor was

10

bound by his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay,"

11

and if it is bound by his contract, the contract was the

12

contract of release. The contract of release was the $50,000

13

amount they paid.

14

Indeed if you look at the Nelson vs. Church decision,

15

they talk about the offset portion.

16

of the majority opinion, "The fact that the employee had been

17

released in the settlement has no bearing on the continued

18

liability of the employer, unless the settlement is in full

19

satisfaction of a plaintiff's claims against both the employee

20

and the employer moreover under Section 15-4-3 of the Joint

21

Obligations Act, an amount received by one obligor is being

22

credited against the amount owed by the rest." So their

23

interpretation there is that the offset or credit amount is the

24

amount received from the one obligor.

25

On the last full paragraph

THE COURT: That didn't satisfy your issue about the
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$300,000.
MR. DUNN:

I agree. The release provisions also take

3

us back to the line of cases that came before Nelson, since

4

Nelson by virtue of its own acknowledgement in the footnote

5

doesn't control our situation.

6

THE COURT: Why doesn't it?

7

MR. DUNN:

8

THE COURT: Why doesn't it?

9
10

Pardon me?
Because they don't get to

that issue?
MR. DUNN:

Yeah, they don't get to that issue.

So the

11

cases that 1997 December 18th, the court of appeals in a

12

situation of following the Nelson vs. the Church decision, in

13

this case the plaintiff, Bonnie Thornock, appealed the trial

14

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant,

15

Dorothy Jensen. Plaintiff contends that the release upon which

16

the defendant relied was ineffective as to the defendant

17

because it listed the defendant's husband (inaudible) defendant

18

as the person released.

19

that they are to interpret — this is on page 2 of the decision

20

as printed, "Accordingly we interpret the statute as consistent

21

with standard public policy."

22

In essence what the decision says is

The public policy is as stated on page 5, which

23

relates back to Krukowitz again, "The statute is inapplicable

24

because release here was given to someone who does not qualify

25

as a defendant under the narrow reading of the statute defeats
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the purpose of the statute, which was to retain the liability

2

of tortfeasors who are not named in the release."

3

policy is to retain liability of tortfeasors not specifically

4

named in the release. That's the standard.

5

THE COURT:

The public

(Inaudible) when we talk about vicarious

6

liability, you are (inaudible) Title 15 and not Title 78,

7

weren't they?

8
9

Isn't that what they say?

MR. DUNN:

No, I don't think that they say that in

Nelson and in Krukowitz, they say that the Liability Reform Act

10

provision controls. The decision in Thornock vs. Jensen was

11

subsequent to Nelson vs. the Church.

12

The decision goes on to say, "To give effect to the

13

statute clarified by our Supreme Court, the focus must remain

14

on the tortfeasors seeking the protection of a release, even

15

though not specifically named in it, not the fortuitous

16

circumstances of whether a party named in the release is really

17

claimed to be at fault. According to the release of Lowell

18

Jensen did not also release the defendant."

19

The case makes additional statements about how the

20

interpretation of the releases in the statute are to be made so

21

as to not make the statute absurd, and a reasonable and

22

sensible construction has to be the construction that's

23

adopted.

24
25

On the last page of the decision, page 5, "There is no
legitimate occasion for giving a release to someone against
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whom there has been no claim.

2

will be the product of a stake, or worse, someone (inaudible)

3

or either a (inaudible) plaintiff exhorting the innocent or

4

devious defendant tricking an unwary plaintiff."

5

If such a release is obtained it

If there was a mistake, the Court in this decision

6

takes the position that if there was an occurrence, such as a

7

mistake in giving the release, that such an occurrence would

8

simply not be possible if the insurance adjuster merely added

9

the name of the vehicle and driver to the release instead of

10

relying on boiler plate language to make it effective. That

11

is, if the adjuster for Nationwide had desired that the release

12

be effective to protect Coca-Cola, he could have easily placed

13

that in the release. That wasn't the intent of the release,

14

that wasn't the purpose of the release.

15

If an honest mistake occurs in the process it is not

16

equitable that that burden fall —

17

inequitable that that burden fall on the insurance company

18

which is in the position to properly instruct and supervise the

19

employees.

20

excuse me, it is not

Here they're even a step back from that because in our

21

situation the defendant, Coca-Cola, is attempting to take

22

advantage of something for which they paid nothing and didn't

23

participate in, and in fact essentially kind of failed to

24

disclose the fact that this gentleman driving the vehicle was

25

their employee.

-29If you go back to the Nelson vs. the Church argument,

1
2

why should a release of someone that you know about that

3

maintains your rights to pursue a cause of action against

4

someone that you know about prevents you from being able to get

5

past the release where you would have included them in it had

6

you known about them, but you didn't know about them, which

7

takes us back to that second paragraph in 15-4-5 of the Joint

8

Obligors Act,

9

Another example of a case that the court of appeals

10

handed down in the 1990's, 1993, is Crowse vs. Utah State

11

Department of Transportation.

12

governing releases did not require the automatic nullification

13

of the release as to parties not expressly named or precisely

14

described in the document.

15

In that case the statute

They adopted what they call the intent rule for

16

interpreting releases, and the intent rule is that tortfeasors,

17

in order to take advantage of the release, must prove that the

18

parties to the agreement intended them to be the beneficiary of

19

the release.

20
21
22

Specifically in Crowse on page 1,017—

THE COURT: Is this a Title 15 case or is this a Title
78 case?
MR. DUNN:

1993, Crowse vs. Utah State Department of

23

Transportation, 852 P.2d 1014, "On March 13, 1987 Crowse, at

24

the advice of his attorney, signed a document releasing his

25

parents, the driver and their insurance company and any and all

-301 I other persons, firms and corporations herein named or referred
2 I to or not from any and all causes of action in exchange for
3 | $200,000 of the liability policy limits for the driver and the
4 I owner of the car.
5

"UDOT paid no consideration for the release, did not

6

participate in the negotiations incident to the release.

7

Indeed, UDOT was apparently unaware that such negotiations were

8

taking place."

9

That's the fact situation that's (inaudible).

THE COURT:

There's a huge difference in that case.

10

The huge difference is is the State of Utah is not an obligor

11

in that case, they are a defendant (inaudible).

12

(inaudible) that were claiming, isn't that right, and so they

13

were suing because of t h e —

14

MR. DUNN:

15

THE COURT:

16

State of Utah is a defendant.

17

any obligation to the other defendants as a joint obligor

18

that's all under Title 15 (inaudible).

19

MR. DUNN:

In that case

Okay.
— t h e road construction (inaudible).

The

The State of Utah didn't have

Correct, but the principle remains the same

20

that the intent of interpreting a release should look into the

21

question of whether or not the released parties were intended

22

to be beneficiaries of the release—

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. DUNN:

25

Well—
On page 1023, "Second, when a party not

specifically named in the release tends to prevail himself of

-311

the release, that party bears the burden of proving that it was

2

the intended beneficiary of the release."

3

show that Coca-Cola was ever intended as the beneficiary of

4

this release.

5

it.

6

Mr. Peterson for the injuries he sustained by virtue of this

7

claim that they should have preserved the rights against the

8

defendant they didn't even know existed, an undisclosed

9

principal.

There is nothing to

They certainly paid nothing towards obtaining

What they want to do is avoid what is their liability to

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. DUNN:

I think you've made your point.
Indeed if you take a look at the dissent

12

that Justice Russon wrote in Nelson vs. the Corporation of the

13

Church of Jesus Christ, his dissent is essentially the position

14

that Mr. Lambert would have you take.

15

release should apply to anybody that's in the position of

16

I'm not quite sure I can make that statement.

17

He's saying that the

His opinion in Childs vs. Newsome in 1995 —

—

this

18

involves another release.

In this case Dale Childs sued Andrea

19

Newsome, and on July 22nd, 1991, Dale Childs agreed to a

20

settlement of his claims against Dellers and Jessie's parents.

21

The settlement terms provided that Dellers' insurer, American

22

States, paid Childs the policy limits of $50,000 in exchange

23

for Childs' signing a release discharging Dellers, American

24

States and all other agents together with all other firms

25

(inaudible) corporations from any liability arising from the
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act —

so this is Title 78 again.
The philosophy of releases adopted even by Justice

3

Russon, Section 78-27-42 was enacted to repeal Section 15-4-4

4

of the Joint Obligors Act, which has codified common law rule

5

that a release of one joint tortfeasor also released all other

6

joint tortfeasors, and then it cites Krukowitz vs. Draper/

7

which is another case worthy of the Court's review.

8
9

So not only does Krukowitz say that 15-4-4 has been
repealed by 78-27-42 in 1995 in this case, the decision goes on

10

to say immediately thereafter, "The statute was designed to

11

retain the liability of tortfeasors and reverse the common law

12

rule so that the release of one joint tortfeasor did not

13

automatically release all tortfeasors."

14

The last sentence in the opinion before the conclusion

15

is, "Thus, pursuant to Section 78-27-42, a release must contain

16

the language either naming the defendant or identifying the

17

defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge

18

that defendant from liability."

19

of this decision, to say that the overruled Section of 15-4-4

20

that the Supreme Court in Childs says has now been repealed by

21

the enactment of 78-27-42, and then to, in my opinion, torture

22

that construction so as to not apply the following sections as

23

inappropriate.

24
25

It strikes me that in the face

Krukowitz is another case which, I think, gives us
guidance from the point of view of the policy that ought to be

-331 | adopted, the public policy that if you pay for a release you
2 | ought to be released, if you don't pay for the release and you
3 | don't participate in any fashion, you ought not be able to take
4 I advantage of the release.
5

The case overturns a Homestead vs. Abbott and out of

6

the GMC diesel decision, cited approval and under 78-27-42

7

talks about the pro tanto repeal of 15-4-4 —

8

of the decision, Section 78-27-42 is, quote, "by a necessary

9

implication," end quote, a pro tanto repeal of 15-4-4 of the

this is on page 2

10

Joint Obligors Act.

11

a Utah law review article written by (inaudible) called

12

comparative negligence contribution amongst joint tortfeasors.

13
14

—

The decision, as I indicated, also has three quotes
that I'd like to read to the Court about what is being sought—

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. DUNN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. DUNN:

19

Then it goes on to say that that falls

What case are you talking about now?
This is Krukowitz, K-r-u-k—
I have a copy.
—versus Draper.

If the Court would like

copies of these cases we certainly c a n —

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DUNN:

(Inaudible).
"Although the employer and employee are not

22

common law tortfeasors, they are nonetheless each obligated for

23

the same thing, total reparations of the damages to the

24

victim."

25

Our situation is one where the employee is the
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released party, the employer is not released, and not released

2

because of, in part, the repeal of that statute. The reason

3

that Nelson vs. the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ

4

doesn't get to that argument is that they don't — they feel

5

they don't need to get to that argument.

6

"In sum, we hold in accord with the above authorities

7

and for the reasons of which they are based that the term

8

'joint tortfeasor' as used in 78-27-40(3) included the master

9

who is vicariously liable for the negligence of a servant and

10

the indemnity provisions of 78-27-41 preserves, quote, "any

11

right of indemnity which may exist under the present law;

12

therefore, Draper was not released by the release executed

13

between the plaintiffs and the home."

14

The next paragraph, "The indemnity language of

15

78-27-41(2) of the Utah Act assures the continuance of the

16

rights and obligations of vicariously liable persons. Thus, a

17

person entitled to indemnity continues to be entitled to

18

indemnity."

19

entitled to be compensated for his loss by a tortfeasor that

20

didn't pay anything for a release is entitled to seek

21

recompense from that tortfeasor.

22

That the person such as Mr. Peterson who is

If you take a look at these cases you can torture the

23

language of tortfeasor and defendant, and you can make the

24

thing look one way or another, but as the court of appeals said

25

in the (inaudible) decision, you try and make sense of it, what
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makes sense of it.

2

not be able to take advantage of a release in which you weren't

3

named, for which you didn't pay anything, and indeed it

4

wouldn't have been brought about if you would have just stepped

5

forward and acknowledged your existence.

6

to the portions of the brief relating to undisclosed principal.

7

What makes sense of it is that you should

I just cite the Court

The last area I would like to address is —

8

of that —

9

about.

as a part

well, now I've got two things I wanted to talk

Very briefly, with reference to vicarious liability

10

(inaudible) talks about vicarious liability and being in this

11

one sense strict liability, strict liability can be assessed in

12

a comparative fault situation, so strict liability can go in as

13

a defendant circumstance if you need to interpret the thing in

14

accordance with what's a defendant and what's a tortfeasor.

15

Last, competence of Mr. Peterson to execute the

16

agreement.

17

required a conservator.

18

a statement from an MD that there was such situation, that such

19

situation was not the case.

20

M

21

doctor, Dr. Peter Heinbecker, M.D.

22

Judge Wilkinson has ruled that Mr. Peterson
Mr. Lambert argued that there was not

If you take a look at attachment

F" to the memorandum, there is an evaluation done by a medical

In the summary and conclusions he apparently —

Mr.

23

Peterson apparently suffered a frontal lobe injury which

24

resulted in the psychological symptoms which would seem to

25

include a lack of interest —

lethargy, difficulty with

-361 | mathematical calculations, difficulty remembering the names of
2 I people and other short-term items, such as appointments,
3

leaving words out in his writing, difficulty comprehending what

4

he is reading, difficulty in following discussions, difficulty

5

in finding words and losing his place when he is doing

6

different projects—

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. DUNN:

9

All that (inaudible).
If Mr. Lambert takes the position that

Elaine Clark's evaluation of Mr. Peterson some number of years

10

later raises an issue of fact, then that becomes a fact issue

11

as to whether or not the release could be executed by Mr.

12

Peterson.

13

THE COURT:

14

lawyer both signed?

15

signing —

16

and his conservator be bound by what she agreed (inaudible)?

17

What about the fact that his wife and his
If he's incompetent then they are

shouldn't he be bound by it?

MR. DUNN:

Shouldn't his lawyer

It seems to me that if you are in a

18

different position, the evaluation that you make of a

19

document—

20

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) to say that he was competent

21

enough to sign it in the eyes of his wife and his attorney four

22

and a half years ago, but now let's make him incompetent.

23

Isn't that what you're saying, let's make him incompetent now

24

so the release isn't any good.

25

MR. DUNN:

What I'm saying is that we don't have to

-371

get to that question at all.

What I'm saying is we don't have

2

to wrestle with the fact issues because the cases that the

3

Court has come down with repeatedly over the years from

4

Krukowitz o n —

5

THE COURT:

6

about incompetence.

7

not talk about that," because I want you to rule on the first

8

issue, and make this one moot.

9
10

MR. DUNN:

That's aside.
Let's not —

You've raised this argument

don't say now, "Well, let's

Well, that's the way I'd like the Court to

find—

11

THE COURT:

I know that's what you want, but if you

12

want to argue this case, the part about the competency, you

13

have to address that.

14

MR. DUNN:

Okay, to address that, it strikes me that

15

on a technical basis that if he was mentally incompetent at the

16

time by virtue of the findings of Dr. Heinbecker, and it may be

17

a fact question, then he didn't have the competence to sign the

18

release.

19

wife had the technical position that they could exercise to

20

either evaluate it for h i m —

21

THE COURT:

At that point in time neither his attorney nor his

(Inaudible) I'm saying incompetent when he

22

signed.

23

saying (inaudible) problems.

24
25

Yeah, you're saying he's incompetent now, are you

MR. DUNN:
that he was.

Again, technically, Judge Wilkinson says

I thought that I made it clear but the report

-381 I from Dr. Heinbecker was in, I think, March of 1983,
2 I

MR. LAMBERT:

3

MR. DUNN:

4

MR. LAMBERT:

5

MR. DUNN:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. DUNN:

8

THE COURT:

9

1993.

1993.
Not long after the accident.

May 20, 1993.
May 23, 1993?
Yes, sir.
So then his attorney and his wife knew all

of this information when they signed with him and had him sign.

10

It seems to me that if there was a question of his competency

11

is it that they agreed to sign on this document representing

12

their views, anyway, he was certainly capable of doing it.

13

MR. DUNN:

14

THE COURT:

She was not then his conservator.
She's his wife.

I mean she certainly, if

15

anybody had concerns about his ability to do this, she would be

16

the one who stepped forward, wouldn't she?

17

MR. DUNN:

When she testified in her deposition, she

18

was concerned about his difficulty with handling a number of

19

things, and it was the beginning of the injury.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DUNN:

22

Very well.
Mr. Peterson received a massive blow to the

head—•

23

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) he was injured in the

24

accident.

I already accepted he had injuries from the

25

accident.

That doesn't address these other issues.

I'm

-391 | concerned about the fact that (inaudible) argument made that he
2 | was competent enough to accept the money, but now that there's
3 | another issue, all of a sudden he's now incompetent.

Does that

4 | mean that you're going to give the money back that the
5 I insurance company gave him, the contract wasn't valid?
6

MR. DUNN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. DUNN:

9

THE COURT:

10

rest?

11

That hasn't yet been evaluated.
Very well.
There's been no request in that regard.
Okay.

Why don't we take a recess.

Do you

Are you finished?
MR. DUNN:

I had just one quote, if I may, before

12

turning it over to Mr. Goodwill.

13

opinion, upon which Mr. Lambert relies, right after the

14

statement that a reliance upon the most has footnote 4 referred

15

to it.

16

one or more of several obligors or of one or more of joint or

17

joint and several obligors shall not discharge the co-obligors

18

against whom the obligee in writing is a part of the same

19

transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his

20

rights, and in the absence of such a reservation of rights,

21

shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in

22

Section 15-4-5."

23

Thank you.

24
25

The Nelson vs. the Church

Footnote 4 says, "The obligee's release or discharge of

We take the position that that's the $50,000.

MR. GOODWILL:

If it pleases the Court and Mr.

Lambert, I've been asked to argue the punitive damage portion
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of the case.

2

Essentially, your Honor, the punitive damage part of

3

the case is based on Hodges vs, Gibson cited in our brief, 1991

4

Supreme Court decision where the Supreme Court adopts the

5

restatement of tort 2nd Section 909. Mr. Lambert has read the

6

four theories upon which punitive damages can be assessed

7

against a master whose servant has committed an act of tort.

8

I think that in our brief we have suggested that as in

9

the Johnson vs. Rogers case where the Court said that there's a

10

jury question on whether or not the company authorized the

11

doing in the manner of the act in that case, which was taking a

12

company vehicle out while in a state of extreme intoxication.

13

In our case, as suggested in their brief on page 21, they say

14

that there's evidence that Coca-Cola had heard that Steingel

15

had a part-time second job. They knew he had a second job,

16

they didn't inquire about how that second job might impact on

17

the performance on his job with Coca-Cola.

18

Had they done so they would have found that this

19

second job was a job where he worked all night and did

20

inventory work and was therefore up all night and then went out

21

on the job and drove his vehicle for Coca-Cola going from store

22

to store.

In this case—

23

THE COURT: So what does that mean?

24

MR. GOODWILL: That means that—

25

THE COURT: That he's unfit?
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MR. GOODWILL:

Yes.

I'm talking about not his

2

unfitness at this point, I'm talking about the principal

3

authorizing the agent doing something as a manner that he was

4

doing it in.

5

of action in our complaint is negligent supervision.

6

If they had an obligation to —

our second cause

In supervising an employee you ought to know what he's

7

doing, and you know enough to know that he's not just working

8

your job, he's working another job.

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay, so he's working two jobs.

MR. GOODWILL:

And you ought to inquire about the

11

impact of that second job on the first job.

12

they would have found out that it in fact made him unfit for

13

him employment on the first job because he was being up all

14

night.

15

he fell asleep, crossed over the center line and hit my client

16

head on.

17

further just to find out that he has a job, not to find out how

18

it impacts on the first job with Coca-Cola, and reckless

19

disregard for the circumstances is a basis for imposing

20

punitive damages.

21

Had they done so

He actually fell asleep in the accident in this case,

I'm saying it's reckless disregard not to inquire

In addition, after the accident, they heard about it

22

within two to three hours —

23

supervisor.

24

nothing to reprimand him so that this would not occur—

25

that was the deposition of the

They did nothing to correct his behavior, they did

THE COURT:

Didn't they do investigation to find out

-421 I it was an accident?
2

MR. GOODWILL:

They found out there was an accident.

3

THE COURT:

4

was an accident, didn't they?

(Inaudible) investigation (inaudible) it

5

MR. GOODWILL:

6

is that they did not —

7

didn't reprimand him or take any affirmative action against

8

him.

9
10

I don't know what they did. All I know
they said in their deposition they

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GOODWILL:

If the agent is unfit and the

11

managerial agent was reckless in retaining or employing him

12

under (b) of the restatement, then that's a basis for holding

13

the employer liable for punitive damages. I'm saying he was

14

unfit because he was working on a job that kept him up all

15

night, causing him to fall asleep when he was on a job the

16

following day, that the principal was reckless in retaining him

17

by not investigating further.

18

I believe that if you compare the Johnson vs. Rogers

19

case with our case, true, there is no drinking, there is no

20

drug involvement in our case—

21

THE COURT:

I'm having (inaudible).

There's nothing

22

like that here going down the road drinking, there's none of

23

that here.

24
25

MR. GOODWILL: No, but I submit that a driver in an
extreme state of exhaustion is more dangerous than a driver—
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Wei don'<t have extreme state of exhaustion,

1

THE COURT:

2

there's no evidence to that.

MR. GOODWILL:

3
4

asleep-

He fell asleep is the evidence.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. GOODWILL:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. GOODWILL:

9

That 's right.

Not evidence of extreme—
And then he was working all night the

night before,

THE COURT:

10
11

Yes, the evidence .Is that he fell

I guess if that's the way you want to

characterize it.
MR. GOODWILL:

12

I think the natural conclusion is that

13

he fell asleep because he hadn't had any sleep the night

14

before.

15

than a driver who's under the influence of an intoxicant.

16

least the driver who is under the influence of an intoxicant

17

has the use of some of his senses, though limited and impaired.

18

A driver asleep has the use of none of his five senses.

I submit that a driver who is asleep is more dangerous

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LAMBERT:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

At

Mr. Lambert?

And I would be brief, your Honor.
Why don't you address the issue that Mr.

22

Dunn is harping on, and that is that the court of appeals and

23

the Supreme Court are saying that Section 15-4-4 has been

24

repealed, in essence, as a new statute 78-27-42.

25

MR. LAMBERT:

I will, your Honor.

I'm going to cover
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three points again first, and I think I can do it briefly.

2

cited, and I'm probably mispronouncing the name, but Krukowitz,

3

or something of that. It's a 1986 Utah Supreme Court decision

4

that involves the Comparative Negligence Act, and they ruled

5

that an entirely different definition of defendant controlled

6

in that case.

7

He

The Nelson case is after the adoption of the Liability

8

Reform Act, and is a 1997 decision. What the Court said,

9

"Notwithstanding the reliance of the parties and the briefs on

10

competing interpretations of the Liability Reform Act—"

11

remember, the case that Mr. Dunn was citing had to do with —

12

was more than 10 years earlier and was the Comparative

13

Negligence Act. We've moved beyond that.

14

this case may be resolved pursuant to the Joint Obligations

15

Act," and then gives a citation.

"We conclude that

16

And then the very footnote that Mr. Dunn relies on,

17

footnote 3, they say, "However, since the LRA, the Liability

18

Reform Act, does not address vicariously liable parties,

19

Section 15-4-4 now applies to those parties."

20

Court has ruled in that very footnote that Mr. Dunn tried to

21

rely on that vicariously — that the Liability Reform Act does

22

not apply to vicariously liable parties*

23

Supreme Court could have been clearer*

24
25

So our Supreme

I don't know how the

Then he reads a court of appeals decision, Thornock,
that's the other decision he relies on. Thornock is
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distinguishable on two grounds.

2

with vicariously liable parties, as does Nelson.

3

inapplicable.

4

First of all, it does not deal
So it is

Secondly, the Thornock decision, which is a court of

5

appeals instead of a Supreme Court decision, does not

6

address —

7

later, it does

8
9

even though the opinion is issued several months
not address Nelson.

Now we can speculate all we want, no doubt, because
Nelson hadn't been decided it wasn't covered in the brief, but

10

nowhere in the Thornock decision is Nelson discussed.

It may

11

be because it is distinguishable because it doesn't involve

12

vicariously liable parties, or it may be they simply ignored

13

it.

14

appeals anyway.

But the Supreme Court decision controls over the court of

15

I invite the Court to re-read Nelson.

It's crystal

16

clear what it holds, and it held in that case that 15-4-4

17

applied in a vicariously liable situation, and 15-4-4 says that

18

where an obligee releases —

19

obligor, that is the employer in this case, against with whom

20

the obligee in writing is part of the same transaction as the

21

release or discharge expressly reserves his rights.

22

it shall not discharge a co-

In Nelson they did, in this case they do not.

They do

23

expressly reserve their rights against American States, and

24

they proceed against them, but they did not against the

25

employer.
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Then Mr. Dunn's final argument was, "Well, it's

2

limited by the language of 15-4-5.w

3

applies to parties who know or who have reason to know.

4

he says that Mr. Peterson didn't know or have reason to know,

5

so that section doesn't apply.

6

reason to know —

7

section says you pay —

8

discharge obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay.

9

an employee of vicarious (inaudible) he's obligated to pay the

The first paragraph
Well,

Although, if they did have

in other words, just ask Mr. Steingel —

that

have reason to (inaudible) release or

10

full amount anyway because of the rights to indemnity.

11

they say that section doesn't apply.

Well,

But

12

The second section is if they don't know or have

13

reason to know, you pay the lesser of two amounts, A) the

14

amount of the fractual share of the obligor release.

Well,

15

that isn't the amount paid, that's the amount that —

I think

16

it's more reasonable, the amount they are ultimately are

17

reliable for, but I think, frankly, it only applies here,

18

partnerships or where there's agreement.

19

It doesn't matter because B) resolves it, it's the

20

lesser amount.

21

contract, Mr. Dunn talked about the contract, but that's not

22

what we're talking about.

23

you're bound by your relation with the co-obligor to pay.

24
25

The amount that such obligor was bound by its

Bound by contract or relation,

Well, when an employee is bound by his relationship to
an employer, the employer has indemnity rights.

The Nelson
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decision, the Joint Obligation Act, I think, are clear.

2

have any further questions on that issue?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LAMBERT:

5

THE COURT:

Well, what about this Krukowitz case?
All right, the Krukowitz—
He says on —

I can't tell you what page

6

it's on, but just before the —

7

(inaudible) before these other authorities (inaudible).

8

know where that is?

9
10

Do you

MR. LAMBERT:

probably last page talks about
Do you

Not without looking at the decision,

but—-

11

THE COURT:

It says the term "joint tortfeasors"

12

(inaudible) vicariously liable for (inaudible) and the

13

indemnity provisions of (inaudible) preserves any right of

14

indemnity (inaudible) law.

15

this case, was not released by the (inaudible) court of appeals

16

case o r —

17

MR. LAMBERT:

It says Draper, the employer in

Well, Nelson deals with that issue

18

directly.

Remember Krukowitz is an 1986 case under the

19

Comparative Negligence Act, the definition of joint defendant

20

or joint is different.

21

adopted the Liability Reform Act they changed that definition

22

to refer to fault, and then this Court dealt with that issue

23

when Mr. Dunn read it in the Nelson case on page 514 in

24

footnote 3.

25

Section 78-27-42 of the CNA was a pro tanto repeal of Section

When we adopted —

They discuss Krukowitz.

M

when this state

We recognize that

-481 | 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act. To the extent that the
2 I Liability Reform Act still addresses regular co-defendants- —
3

regular co-defendants, those are (inaudible) who are liable

4

because of fault, "the LRA will supersede or add as a pro tanto

5

repeal of Section 15-4-4 as to those defendants."

6

The next sentence, "However, since the LRA does not

7

address vicariously liable parties, Section 15-4-4 now applies

8

to those parties." The Nelson takes care of that.

9

THE COURT: That settles that question.

10

MR. LAMBERT: The second issue I wanted to briefly

11

reply to is the argument by Mr. Dunn that somehow we hid in the

12

bush or we're trying to take advantage of payments made by

13

other people.

14

can't be, (inaudible) that we participated in these release, we

15

made false representation or anything else. That's simply not

16

true.

17

Of course, there's no evidence because there

What this case, what this argument really is about,

18

Mr. Dunn is giving you a release and trust agreement, a copy of

19

the release and trust agreement wherein he entered into a —

20

not he, but American States, who is the interest of whom he

21

represented, entered into an agreement whereby they wished to

22

exercise subrogation rights to recover their $300,000. This is

23

really about a debate, really, about American States trying to

24

get their $300,000 back.

25

I think if you will look at that release and trust
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agreement that he gave you, you will find —

2

1994 agreement, and you will find that it is signed by Mr.

3

Peterson.

4

argument on a document that he claims to be enforceable.

5

Because Mr. Peterson signed it —

6

Peterson signed it, and I think that should put an end

7

completely and totally to this argument that the release is

8

unenforceable.

9

document.

10

I think it's a

So even Mr. Dunn here is relying in support of his
Why?

not Mrs. Peterson, but Mr.

They had him entered into a subsequent

Now with respect to the —

obviously we think the

11

Nelson case releases us and that solves the problem.

12

respect to Mr. Dunn's argument about the credit of the

13

$300,000, Nelson case makes it clear that you get credit for

14

money that's paid in behalf of the tortfeasor.

15

in this case is Mr. Steingel, who fell asleep when driving, and

16

under a third motorist coverage, pays for the liability of the

17

underinsured motorist.

18

client, who isn't underinsured, they paid for the underinsured

19

motorist, it's based strictly on his liability.

20

With

The tortfeasor

They didn't pay for the liability of my

We quoted that policy language in our original memo

21

when we made the original argument that we were entitled to the

22

$350,000.

23

to recoup the money from the underinsured motorist, but in this

24

case, of course, Mr. Peterson has released that underinsured

25

motorist carrier, and they have no right.

Then what underinsured motorist carriers do is try
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1

I think for a number of reasons that American States

2

is not entitled to recoup their $300,000, and that is not in

3

the interest of Mr. Peterson. But based on our initial

4

argument, it's clear we get credit under Nelson if the release

5

doesn't release us for a vicarious liability, and based on

6

these arguments, that seems crystal clear.

7

Just one final comment, and that has to do with

8

punitive damages. You can't allow punitive damages to go to a

9

jury based on a negligence allegation or argument that we

10

negligently supervised.

11

made that clear. And their only argument where they didn't

12

inquire as to the effect of Mr. Peterson's working all night.

13

Now assuming there's true, because there's no evidence before

14

the Court, that is evidence of negligence.

15

punitive damage issue.

16

It has to be reckless. Even Johnson

It's clearly not a

I do think it's very important to point out to the

17

Court that there is not any evidence that this part-time job

18

required Mr. Peterson to work all night every night. He chose

19

to do so on this particular night, and there is no information

20

and no evidence in this case that Swire was aware of that fact

21

or aware of his state of alleged —

22

of the accident. There just simply is no evidence.

23

being very tired on the day

Then he finally says, "You didn't punish him.M

Well,

24

we did go to the safety committee, who found that it was a

25

preventable accident, and suggested ways that it could be
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prevented.

2

approval or applause of the activity.

3

punitive damages.

4

liability in this case.

5

That may not be punishment, but it's hardly
There is no basis for

Again, my client is released from vicarious

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Lambert.

In this matter, I

6

believe that the position taken by defendant as to punitive

7

damages is correct (inaudible).

8

defendant is correct if he's liable at all and is entitled to

9

an offset of $350,000.

I also believe that the

That leaves us with the critical issue

10

of whether or not he should be liable or was released by the

11

document signed by the plaintiff, his wife and his attorney.

12

As far as the incompetency issue, I don't think

13

there's any evidence to establish he was incompetent when he

14

signed.

15

a conservator appointed for him doesn't establish he was

16

entitled to sign the document on the date that he signed it.

17

It's four and a half years later, having a guardian or

I believe that the Nelson case is dispositive in this

18

matter, and that in order to maintain an action against a

19

vicarious liable employer a party must be so reserved and

20

released (inaudible) reserve against Coca-Cola, the motion will

21

be granted.

22

Will you submit a proper order?

23

MR. LAMBERT:

24
25

I will, and I'll submit it to counsel as

for approval as to form.
(Hearing concluded)
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